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WHAT’S BENEATH THE GRAHAM
CRACKER?:
THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF
COMPARATIVE LAW ON
THE FUTURE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
REFORM
AFTER GRAHAM V. FLORIDA
David A. Shapiro*
“There can only be a few issues where government policies in countries
like Libya and Burma appear more progressive than those in the
United States. Juvenile sentencing is one of them.”1
“But the Prize for the Court's Most Feeble Effort to fabricate ‘national
consensus’ must go to [the majority’s] appeal . . . to the views of . . .
members of the so-called ‘world community’ . . . whose notions of justice
are (thankfully) not always those of our people.”2

INTRODUCTION
In the United States, juvenile sentencing reformers find
themselves battling parties espousing varied and conflicting
interests. American juvenile sentencing practices are the
harshest in the world, despite the fact that the United States
once was the global leader in juvenile justice reform.3 Nations
spanning the six inhabited continents modeled their
* A.B., Washington University in St. Louis (2009); J.D., Brooklyn Law
School (2012). Incoming Gault Fellow at the National Juvenile Defender
Center (2012–2014). I would like to thank Professor William D. Araiza for
his thoughtful edits and support throughout law school, Professor Cynthia
Godsoe for her guidance, Mark Soler, and Jason Szyani at the Center for
Children’s Law & Policy, Amy Conroy, my sister Deborah, my parents, and
my friends and colleagues from college, law school, and the wide world of
juvenile justice.
1 Ari Paul, America’s Imprisoned Kids, AM. PROSPECT (May 10, 2007),
http://prospect.org/article/americas-imprisoned-kids.
2 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 347 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
3 See Barry Krisberg, Rediscovering the Juvenile Justice Ideal in the
United States, in COMPARATIVE YOUTH JUSTICE: CRITICAL ISSUES 6–7 (John
Muncie & Barry Goldson eds., 2006) [hereinafter CRITICAL ISSUES].
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enlightened, compassionate juvenile justice systems on our
own.4 Today, however, the roles are reversed. It appears that
it is the fifty states that have much to learn from juvenile
justice reforms overseas.
This article examines the Supreme Court’s application of
international law in its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and
argues that reformers should look beyond the Court’s analysis
and use comparative law to obtain their goals of juvenile
sentencing and policy reform. In 2010, the United States
Supreme Court had the opportunity to declare unconstitutional
the sentence of life without the opportunity of parole for crimes
committed by minors (also known as juvenile life without
parole, or “JLWOP”).5 Such a decision would have remedied a
discrepancy that sets the United States apart from virtually all
other nations.6 Instead, in Graham v. Florida, the Court
tiptoed around the issue,7 holding that JLWOP violated the
Eighth Amendment only when imposed for non-homicide
crimes and that while “a state need not guarantee the offender
eventual release . . . it must provide . . . some realistic
opportunity to obtain release before the end of that term.”8
The holding in Graham left many questions unanswered:
What constitutes a “realistic opportunity to obtain release?”9
What if our “standards of decency”—the relatively fluid
standard used to measure the constitutionality of state
punishment—evolve more within the next few years?10 Will
Id.
See, e.g., Juvenile Life Without Parole (JLWOP), CTR. FOR CHILD. L. &
POL’Y, http://www.cclp.org/jlwop.php (last visited Jan.15, 2012).
6 See Juvenile Life Without Parole, NAT’L CTR. FOR YOUTH L., http://www.
youthlaw.org/juvenile_justice/6/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2012).
7 To be fair, some scholars consider the Graham decision to be a giant
leap in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, marking “the first time the Court
ever applied its more searching ‘categorical’ Eighth Amendment analysis—
heretofore reserved solely for capital sentences—to a term of years sentence.”
Scott Hechinger, Juvenile Life Without Parole (JLWOP): An Antidote to
Congress’s One-Way Criminal Law Ratchet?, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 408, 410 (2011).
8 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010).
9 See Lloyd Dunkelberger, Juvenile Offenders Still Get Near-Life Terms,
SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE, Nov. 21, 2010, available at http://www.herald
tribune.com/article/20101121/ARTICLE/11211086 (wondering the same).
10 “Standards of decency have evolved since 1980. They will never stop
doing so.” Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2036 (Stevens, J., concurring).
4
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Graham soon be extended to homicide offenses?11 Those
questions I leave for others.12
Rather, this article argues that scholars ought to explore
the views that Justice Scalia rejected out-of-hand in his
dissent—that the Supreme Court “should cease putting forth
foreigners’ views as part of the reasoned basis of its
decisions.”13 Indeed, advocates ought not wait for the next
Supreme Court decision to argue for reforms. They can use
Scalia’s reasoned bases relative to the far more progressive
juvenile justice policies of other nations to pursue change
domestically through state and local legislatures.
This tactic is necessary for two reasons. First,
conservatives on the Supreme Court will continue to rail
against the use—even the mere consideration—of international
law, rendering the Court’s liberals, allied with Justice
Clearly, the United States Supreme Court’s juvenile jurisprudence
continues to surprise scholars. In 2010, Jeffrey Fagan argued that “the best
way to understand Graham is to see it as results-oriented. The Court denied
juvenile LWOP to non-murderers so that it could save mandatory LWOP for
capital crimes and other murders.” Jeffrey Fagan, Juvenile Justice Delayed?,
NAT’L L.J., June 14, 2010, available at http://www.law.yale.edu/news/11
875.htm. Following Roper, Fagan continued, “the Court would have risked a
crisis of legitimacy if it went the next step and banned the second-harshest
punishment, no matter how logical that extension might be.” Id. On March
20, 2012, the Supreme Court heard oral argument on two cases related to the
imposition of JLWOP for homicide crimes, but will most likely limit its
holding to young teens. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Jackson v. Arkansas,
2011 WL 5322575 (No. 10-9647); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Miller v.
Alabama, 2011 WL 5322568 (No. 10-9646).
12 Scholars have already started to answer them.
See, e.g., Alice
Ristroph, Hope, Imprisonment, and the Constitution, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 75
(2010) (commenting on whether Graham provides any hope at all for
sentencing reform); Dirk van Zyl Smit, The Abolition of Capital Punishment
for Persons Under the Age of Eighteen Years in the United States of America.
What Next?, 5 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 393, 400 (2005) (arguing that the Roper
decision should apply to all JLWOP); Elizabeth Cepparulo, Note, Roper v.
Simmons: Unveiling Juvenile Purgatory: Is Life Really Better than Death?, 16
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 225 (2007) (arguing that the Roper decision
should apply to all JLWOP). Some commentaries appear to be more like
stabs in the dark. See generally Richard S. Frase, Graham's Good News—
and Not, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 54 (2010) (arguing that Graham will most likely
not be applied beyond its present context of juvenile non-homicide offenses);
Michael M. O’Hear, The Beginning of the End for Life Without Parole?, 23
FED. SENT’G REP. 1 (2010) (arguing that there may not be much progress).
13 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 627 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
11
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Kennedy, far too timid to explicitly harness foreign law to effect
change.14 Because federal decisions have been so tentative in
their embrace of international standards,15 state legislatures,
rather than the federal courts, ought to be the focal point of
juvenile justice reform for advocates seeking to highlight both
the progress made and standards developed abroad. Second,
the best policy choices can only come about after comparing
and considering the best ideas. Using international ideas at
the state and local levels will maximize the amount of reformoriented action and thus promote the change advocates seek.
This article proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses how
the United States Supreme Court has used international law in
its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, focusing in particular on
how its decisions have in some instances relied upon, and in
other instances repudiated, international law.16 Even where
the justices incorporated international law into judicial
decision-making, the current treatment of international
sources fails to provide the nuanced approach necessary to
produce compelling change in the field of juvenile justice
reform.
Part II posits that reformers’ efforts are misplaced when
they emphasize international law as a rationale to encourage
this country’s federal courts to increase leniency on juvenile
offenders. Specifically, I argue that the current focus relies too
heavily on international treaties that the United States has not
even ratified, such as the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child (CRC), and on broad generalizations
regarding the practices of the Western world as a whole. This
focus is improper not only because the sources lack nuance, but
because international law does not just lead—it follows.
International legal norms do not just set standards—they are
derived from pre-existing policies and laws. We ought to look
14 See, e.g., Jim Kelly, U.S. Supreme Court Clarifies Limits on its Use of
International Law, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE WATCH (May 19, 2010), http://www.
globalgovernancewatch.org/spotlight_on_sovereignty/us-supreme-court-clarif
ies-limits-on-its-use-of-international-law.
15 See id.
16 See generally James I. Pearce, Note: International Materials and the
Eighth Amendment: Some Thoughts on Method, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L.
235 (2010) (explaining that the Court wasted opportunities in both Roper and
Graham to clarify the methodology by which the majorities incorporated
international opinion into their Eighth Amendment jurisprudence).
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to the rationales behind the laws and policies of individual
countries, rather than countries as groups, viewing the CRC as
a compromise, rather than as the gold standard. This new
framework emphasizes a dynamic, comparative approach to
juvenile rights reform in America over a consensus-based
international law paradigm that has, so far, been the go-to
standard for advocates.
In Part III, using the framework I have established, I
argue that advocacy emphasizing reforms and policies of
individual nations directed towards state legislatures is the
best way to reform juvenile sentencing. By evaluating the
rationales that various nations have put forth to justify their
more flexible approaches to juvenile sentencing, reformers here
can change not only sentencing, but also the whole arena of
juvenile justice. I examine decisions of foreign courts and the
policy choices of legislatures internationally. By learning from
the trial and error of other sovereign nations,17 we can reform
juvenile sentencing nationwide, well beyond the timid limits
that the Supreme Court established in Graham.18 Ultimately,
I believe this more nuanced approach is illustrative of how far
juvenile sentencing reform can and should go in the United
States.19

17 “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country.” New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
See also A. Michael Froomkin, Of Governments and
Governance, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 617, 630 (1999) (writing, about the
context of ideas for internet governance, “[o]ther forms of regulatory
arbitrage suit U.S. interests . . . given our federal system, however, it seems a
little odd to find . . . that the contribution of nations as ‘big labs of democracy’
is not recognized.”) (emphasis added).
18 And that may or may not change in the near future, as it looks beyond
Graham’s implications, most likely to juveniles who have committed
homicide.
19 This article does not address how the Supreme Court has used
international law in weighing due process protections for juveniles. Because
the juveniles facing JLWOP have been transferred to adult court, Eighth
Amendment, rather than Fourteenth Amendment standards apply to the
sentences given. See Mark Soler, Dana Schoenberg & Marc Schindler,
Juvenile Justice: Lessons for a New Era, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y
483, 508 (2009).

5
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I. THE CAUTIOUS AMBIGUITY OF EIGHTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Supreme Court and International Law within an Eighth
Amendment Framework
Today, in determining whether a sentence violates the
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution,20 the
Supreme Court looks to what it has termed the “evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.”21 To negotiate22 the current evolving standard, the
Justices first use “objective indicia of consensus.”23 These
include the sentencing policies of state legislatures24 and actual
sentencing practices.25
Then the Court applies its “own
independent
judgment”
to
determine
violations
of
constitutionality.26
Advocates have struggled to find a place for international
law within this muddled framework.27 The “own independent
judgment” prong is vague and seems to grant the Justices
much leeway to hold a sentence cruel and unusual. On one
hand, this prong implicates international norms because, in
20 “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
21 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010) (citing Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
22 I use this term because some scholars believe that the Court does not
actually apply the “evolving standards” test. See John F. Stinneford,
Evolving Away from Evolving Standards of Decency, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 87
(Oct. 2010) (arguing that the Supreme Court is at least tacitly leaving the
“evolving standards of decency test behind”).
23 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005).
24 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002).
25 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 831–32 (1988) (plurality
opinion).
26 Roper, 543 U.S. at 564.
27 Amnesty International argues that international “standards also
provide an important indicator of evolving standards of decency, which in
turn illuminate the contours of acceptable conduct under the Eighth
Amendment.” Brief for Amnesty International et al. as Amici Curiae Support
of Petitioners, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (Nos. 08-7412, 087621) [hereinafter Brief for Amnesty International]; see also James I. Pearce,
Note: International Materials and the Eighth Amendment: Some Thoughts on
Method, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 235 (2010) (noting that one could fit
international law into either the subjective prong or the objective indices
prong).
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today’s burgeoning, fast-globalizing marketplace of ideas, the
Justices’ opinions are at least subtly informed by laws and
norms of other nations.28 Indeed, David Nelkin posits: “[in] a
globalizing world, legal systems find their place in a field of
‘inter-cultural legality’ whereby other models (or better, models
of models) serve as cultural resources for development of our
own system through processes of imposition, imitation or
rejection.”29
Unfortunately, pressure from conservatives prevents the
Justices from placing real meaning in the sentencing laws of
other nations, or at least prevents them from being honest in
their use of international law.30 Instead, Justices refuse to
admit the persuasive power contained in international law,
even when there is no reason to cite to it other than for its
persuasion.
Thus, juvenile justice advocates tackling
sentencing reform should first address what I call “the honesty
problem.”
B. The Supreme Court’s Use of International Law & The
Honesty Problem
1. Introduction
Throughout its jurisprudence, the United States Supreme
Court has refused to quantify anything approaching the exact
value or even significance of international law.31 I call this “the
28 See David Sloss, Do International Norms Influence State Behavior?, 38
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 181 (2006) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s Roper
opinion did not admit to its true rationale for finding capital punishment for
juveniles unconstitutional and that, in fact, an honest reading of Roper
necessitates a reliance on international law); cf. Jeffrey Fagan & Valerie
West, The Decline of the Juvenile Death Penalty: Scientific Evidence of
Evolving Norms, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 427, 495 (2005) (arguing that
since the Court had considered the constitutionality of the juvenile death
penalty in 1989 in Stanford v. Kentucky, that societal norms had evolved
“opposing the death penalty for juvenile offenders”).
29 David Nelken, Italy: A Lesson in Tolerance?, in CRITICAL ISSUES, supra
note 3, at 148. [ approved]
30 For pressure from outside the Court, see, e.g., Steven Groves,
Questions for Judge Sotomayor on the Use of Foreign and International Law,
HERITAGE FOUND. (July 6, 2009), http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2009/
pdf/wm25 25.pdf (arguing that Sotomayor might attempt to “impos[e] foreign
norms and practices through judicial fiat”).
31 See infra notes 33–38.
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honesty problem.” In cases prior to Graham, the Court
“recognized,”32 “noted,” and “observed”33 international law,
deeming it “not irrelevant.”34 International law provided
“confirmation,”35 but has not been “controlling”36 in
determining the validity of opinions. The Graham majority
expressly recognized that international law played a role in its
decision, helping to define cruel and unusual punishment for
the seventh time since 1958.37 Still, even the most progressive
Justices have described foreign law in ambiguous, cursory, and
conservative ways.
In 1958, in the landmark case of Trop v. Dulles, a plurality
of the Supreme Court of the United States held as
unconstitutional the punishment of the revocation of
citizenship,38 noting that “[t]he civilized nations of the world
are in virtual unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed
as punishment for a crime.”39 This case marked the first time
the Court looked outside our borders to determine what global
society felt about certain punishments. The plurality further
noted that a United Nations (“UN”) survey “of the nationality
laws of 84 nations of the world reveals that only two countries .
. . impose denationalization as a penalty for desertion. In this
country, the Eighth Amendment forbids that to be done.”40 The
See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 n.21 (2002) (recognizing that
“within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes
committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.”).
33 See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830–31, 830 n.31 (1988)
(plurality opinion) (noting the abolition of the juvenile death penalty “by
other nations that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading
members of the Western European community,” and observing that “[w]e
have previously recognized the relevance of the views of the international
community in determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual.”).
34 “It is . . . not irrelevant here that out of 60 major nations in the world
surveyed in 1965, only 3 retained the death penalty for rape where death did
not ensue.” Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–76 (2005).
35 Id. at 576.
36 Id. at 575.
37 “Yet at least from the time of the Court’s decision in Trop, the Court
has referred to the laws of other countries and to international authorities as
instructive for its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of
“cruel and unusual punishments.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102–03 (1958)
(plurality opinion).
38 Id. at 102.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 103.
32
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Trop plurality cited to nations that had banned citizenship
revocation as a punishment.41 The link between international
law and the Court’s holding, however, was unclear. 42 The Trop
dissent never attacked the use of other countries’ laws in
coming to a holding that denaturalization constituted a cruel
and unusual punishment. In fact, the dissent showed that the
laws of certain countries allowed the punishment of
denaturalization, meaning those governments could have
thought it neither cruel nor unusual.43
In 1988, Justices Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun once again embraced a conception of “the ‘evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society’ that had no express limits or ‘contours.’”44 Their
plurality opinion in Thompson v. Oklahoma, holding that a
fifteen-year-old could not be executed for murder, once again
compared the laws of various nations, including those of the
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, Italy, Spain, and
Switzerland, among others.45 The opinion also cited
international treaties, including the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, the American Convention on Human
Rights, and the Geneva Convention. It relegated much of the
discussion of international and comparative law to a footnote.46
Scalia scathingly dissented, “[t]he plurality’s reliance upon
Amnesty International’s account of what it pronounces to be
civilized standards of decency in other countries is totally
inappropriate as a means of establishing the fundamental
beliefs of this Nation.”47 Conservatives throughout the Court’s
Id. at 102–03.
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Atkins, explicitly noted that “the Trop
plurality—representing a view of only a minority of the Court—offered no
explanation for its own citation.” Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 325
(2002).
43 Trop, 356 U.S. at 126 (Frankfurter, Burton, Clark, and Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
44 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821 (1988) (plurality opinion)
(Stevens, J.) (citing Trop, 356 U.S. at 101 (plurality opinion) (Warren, C.J.)).
45 Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830–31 (plurality opinion) (Stevens, J.).
46 Of course, footnotes are not items to be cast aside.
The famous
Carolene footnote, after all, bore the doctrine of strict scrutiny. See Abner
Mikva, Goodbye to Footnotes, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 647 (1985). “All too often,
yesterday’s obiter dictum become tomorrow’s law of the land.” Id. at 649.
47 Thompson, 487 U.S. at 869 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
41
42
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Eighth Amendment jurisprudence have held this line.
2. Roper v. Simmons48 and International Law
Justice Scalia decried the use of international law in
Stanford v. Kentucky, the 1989 decision upholding the
A
constitutionality of capital punishment for minors.49
majority signed onto his first footnote, which read, “[w]e
emphasize that it is American conceptions of decency that are
dispositive, rejecting the contention of petitioners and their
various amici that the sentencing practices of other countries
are relevant.”50 Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Roper v.
Simmons, holding the juvenile death penalty unconstitutional,
overturned Scalia’s Stanford v. Kentucky opinion.51 Kennedy
wrote, “[o]ur determination that the death penalty is a
disproportionate punishment for offenders under 18 finds
confirmation in the stark reality that the United States is the
only country in the world that continues to give official
sanction to the juvenile death penalty.”52 Kennedy noted that
such laws and international authorities had always been
“instructive”53 to the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
even though the past opinions he cited for this proposition,
however, never used the term.54 Perhaps most revealing is
that the citations he used to support his proposition all
referenced either pluralities or footnotes—never an in-text fiveJustice majority.55 Thus, Roper was groundbreaking in that
the majority did not relegate international treaties, including
the CRC,56 to a footnote. Justice O’Connor, even in dissent,
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
50 Id. at 370 n.1.
51 Roper, 543 U.S. at 551.
52 Id. at 575.
53 The word “instructive” is perhaps purposefully broad—it might mean
either “serving to instruct” or simply “enlightening.”
54 Roper, 543 U.S. at 576–77.
55 Justice O’Connor lists these references in a long string cite referring
to the Trop plurality, an Atkins footnote, the Thompson plurality, a
Thompson plurality footnote, an Enmund footnote, and, lastly, a Coker
footnote. Roper, 543 U.S. at 604 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
56 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 575 (Kennedy, J., majority opinion).
48
49
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expressly revoked her prior accord with Scalia in Stanford,57
disagreeing with his contention “that foreign and international
law have no place in our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.”58
For the first time, six Justices agreed that international law
was at least relevant to Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
Whereas Justice Scalia would like to see an end placed on
the Supreme Court’s use of international law in most
contexts,59 this article would ask that the Supreme Court only
apply it consistently. As Justice Scalia pointed out, for
example, the United Kingdom banned the death penalty for
both juveniles and adults, yet the majority cited to the UK ban
to show how the country from which we derived our Eighth
Amendment disallowed capital punishment of juveniles.60
Such a distinction would only matter if we also banned the
death penalty completely.61 Justice Scalia was also prescient in
acknowledging that “in addition to barring the execution of
under-18 offenders, the [CRC] prohibits [JLWOP]. If we are
truly going to get in line with the international community,
then the Court’s reassurance that the death penalty is really
not needed, since ‘[JLWOP] is itself a severe sanction,’. . . gives
little comfort.”62
Still, given the “evolving standards of decency” framework
used to determine the constitutionality of punishments,63 there
is little need to place what it means to be decent in a
particularly localized, i.e., Westernized, concept of human
decency.64
As the Roper Court both acknowledged and
57 She dissented in spite of her acknowledgment of the relevance of
international law because there was “no such domestic consensus . . . and the
recent emergence of an otherwise global consensus does not alter that basic
fact.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 605 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
58 Id. at 604.
59 See Justice Antonin Scalia, Keynote Address at the Annual Meeting of
the American Society of International Law: Foreign Legal Authority in the
Federal Courts (2004), in 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L. L. PROC. 305 (2004).
60 Cf. Roper, 543 U.S. at 577 (majority opinion) (“As of now, the [U.K.]
has abolished the death penalty in its entirety.”).
61 Cf. id. at 623 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
62 Id. (citation omitted).
63 A plurality of the Court in 1958 established this standard as the go-to,
and it has been utilized ever since. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101 (plurality opinion).
64 There is nothing particularly originalist about Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence. Many scholars disagree with the primacy placed upon the
new “evolving” framework. See, e.g., John F. Stinneford, The Original
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cautioned, “[i]t does not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution
or our pride in its origins to acknowledge that the express
affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other nations and
peoples simply underscores the centrality of those same rights
within our own heritage of freedom.”65 Indeed, the Graham
majority appeared to look to those precepts.
The Graham majority stated that “the overwhelming
weight of international opinion against [JLWOP for nonhomicide offenses] provide[s] respected and significant
confirmation for our conclusions [that the imposition of JLWOP
was cruel and unusual].”66 However, the Court has still never
asked why such confirmation from international sources is
even necessary to make determinations regarding the Eighth
Amendment of the American Constitution. Certainly, its use of
international opinion begs the question—what is the value of
looking outside America for confirmation if such confirmation
adds nothing to the opinion? The answer must be, of course,
that the Court must be using international law not only for
mere confirmation, but also for persuasive power. The Graham
majority either misspoke when it said it looked to underlying
rationales, or it misspoke when it said it did not use
international law beyond its “confirmatory value.”67
Meaning of ‘Unusual’: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation,
102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1825 (2008) (arguing “The Framers of the Bill of
Rights understood the word ‘unusual’ to mean ‘contrary to long usage.’
Recognition of the word’s original meaning will precisely invert the ‘evolving
standards of decency’ test and ask the Court to compare challenged
punishments with the longstanding principles and precedents of the common
law, rather than shifting and nebulous notions of ‘societal consensus’ and
contemporary ‘standards of decency.’”).
65 Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
66 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010) (majority opinion)
(citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 572). Because the conservative Justice Alito
replaced Justice O’Connor on the bench, only five in Graham continued to
advocate for the inclusion of international law within the majority’s
determination. Although six justices voted to repeal the JLWOP sentence in
Graham, Chief Justice Roberts did not agree it should be done in every
instance. Interestingly, and most certainly on purpose, Chief Justice Roberts
never mentions the word “international” or another country’s name in his
concurrence. Id. at 2036–43 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). Today, only three
justices criticize the use of international law explicitly. The criticism is, as
Justice Thomas notes, “confine[d] to a footnote.” Id. at 2053 n.12 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
67 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034. A discussion of the Supreme Court’s
honest use of international law I leave to other, more equipped scholars. See,
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Confirmatory value in this context is not merely an affirming
tool. The honesty problem remains.
II. THE PROBLEM OF LOOKING TO INTERNATIONAL NORMS
The Supreme Court has never addressed the reasons why
essentially all other nations have done away with JLWOP. Up
to and including Graham, aside from discussing the policy of
Great Britain, the Court has discussed broad treaties and
placed persuasive emphasis on the sheer number of nations
opposing certain sentencing policies.68 It has not emphasized
underlying rationales. Because there is no evidence the Court
will examine these rationales in the future, advocates ought to
examine them themselves.
A. The Graham Court and the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child
The Graham majority cited the CRC,69 ratified by all but
the United States and Somalia,70 as part of its argument to end
JLWOP in America.
Crucially, the Brief for Amnesty
International cited to international law throughout, paying
particular attention to the CRC.71 The relevant provision,
Article 37(a), reads: “[n]o child shall be subjected to torture or
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
Neither capital punishment nor life imprisonment without
possibility of release shall be imposed for offences committed by
persons below eighteen years of age.”72 Thus, the Court’s
honesty problem reveals itself once more—the relevant
provision of the CRC clearly makes no exception for JLWOP
when a juvenile offender has committed homicide. Despite this
e.g., Ernst A. Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 148 (2005) (discussing the Court’s use of foreign law to provide
support for its reasoning in normative terms).
68 For more on the idea of the power of “sheer numbers” in terms of
international law and Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, see Young, supra
note 67.
69 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034.
70 David Weissbrodt, Prospects for Ratification of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, 20 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 209, 210 (2006).
71 Brief for Amnesty International, supra note 27.
72 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 37(a),
opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
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fact, Graham’s holding makes a distinction between juveniles
who kill and juveniles who do not.
The CRC also states that juvenile offenders are to be
incarcerated for the minimum necessary time;73 though the
Graham Court conveniently avoided any discussion of
incarceration lengths for juveniles beyond the absolute of
JLWOP, amici felt no need to press the issue upon the Court.74
Thus, while reformers should continue to advocate for its
ratification, the use of the CRC at the federal court level is
disingenuous at best and potentially harmful to the cause of
national juvenile justice reform due to its likelihood of closing
off conservatives to the underlying policy debate regarding
juvenile sentencing.
Additionally, as a matter of pure constitutional law, the
Supreme Court’s choice to examine the CRC arguably usurped
the Senate’s authority to ratify international treaties75 because
the United States has signed, but not ratified, the CRC and is
therefore not bound by its provisions.76 Reformers should
certainly push for ratification of the CRC, particularly to
provide the federal government with the impetus to abide by its
sensible provisions. Ratifying the CRC would also help provide
a national impetus for change at the state level.77 But
ratification is a separate task from pre-ratification advocacy,
which should and must be carried out in a forum apart from
73 Id. art. 37(b) (“No child shall be deprived of his or her liberty
unlawfully or arbitrarily. The arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child
shall be in conformity with the law and shall be used only as a measure of
last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time.”).
74 There is no mention of this provision anywhere in the brief. See Brief
for Amnesty International, supra note 27.
75 See Curtis A. Bradley, The Juvenile Death Penalty and International
Law, 52 DUKE L.J. 486, 492 (2002).
76 Id. at 512–13. Bradley writes, “courts properly will decline to apply
international law to override the considered choices of the president and
Senate in their ratification of treaties. In addition, because of concerns
relating to both separation of powers and federalism, courts properly will
decline to apply customary international law to override state criminal
punishment, especially when (as is the case here) the political branches have
expressly declined to do so by treaty.” Id.
77 Were the United States to ratify the CRC (without reservation), it
would become the law of the land. See Jeffrey Huffines, The Role of N.G.O.s
in U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Treaties, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L.
641, 650 (1997).
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the Supreme Court. By using a non-ratified document at the
Court to ask for juvenile sentencing reform, advocates might be
doing more harm than good. To move the discussion forward,
advocates ought to more strongly consider allying with
conservatives to enact real juvenile policy reforms on the local
and national stage.78
B. Just How Progressive are Juvenile Sentences Elsewhere?
Finally, looking to the CRC hides the amazing truth of
what lies beneath its JLWOP standard: that many countries
with juvenile-specific sentencing laws go well beyond what
even the most progressive juvenile sentencing reform advocates
in the United States seek to achieve. The sentencing lengths
below represent not what reformers should pursue, but only
serve to demonstrate that a varied, yet large, number of
countries all agree on one thing—dealing with juvenile
offenders does not require the harsh sentencing that the
United States feels is appropriate.

Maximum Sentence for Juveniles
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

78 Perhaps the strongest ally is the Right on Crime movement.
Advocating a reduction in unnecessary confinement, an increase in effective
school discipline policies, reviews of juvenile sentences, and increased
community-based programming, the Right on Crime movement makes a
powerful ally. See Priority Issues: Juvenile Justice, RIGHT ON CRIME,
http://www.righton crime.com/priority-issues/juvenile-justice/ (last visited
Jan. 15, 2012).
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Maximum Sentence for Juveniles
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Lebanon
Liechtenst…
Moldova
Suriname
Costa Rica
Georgia
Lesotho
Austria
Congo
Djibouti
Norway
Morocco
South…
Romania
Rwanda
Senegal
Tajikistan
Hungary
Mali
France
United…

Maximum Sentence for Juveniles

Country
Brazil79

Max.
Sent.
3

Country
Ghana80

Max.
Sent.
3

Country
Uganda81

Max.
Sent
3

79 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties
Due in 1992: Brazil,¶ 575, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/3/Add.65 (Dec. 17, 2003).
80 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Second Periodic Reports of
States Parties Due in 1997: Ghana, ¶ 52, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/65/Add.34 (July
14, 2005).
81 Children Act of 1997, C. 59, § 94(7) (Uganda), available at
http://www.ulii.org/ug/legis/consol_act/ca199786/
(Uganda’s
three-year
maximum is also dramatic in that it replaces an adult corollary punishment
of death, making it one of the most liberal juvenile sentencing statutes in the
world).
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Ecuador82

4

Sweden83

4

Switzerland84

4

Mexico85

5

Bahrain86

6

Slovakia87

7

Cape Verde88

8

Denmark89

8

Estonia90

8

Honduras91

8

Iceland92

8

Mozambique93

8

82 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Fourth Periodic Reports of
States Parties Due in 2007, Ecuador, ¶ 526, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/ECU/4 (July 10,
2009).
83 See Juvenile Care for Teen Girlfriend Murder, THE LOCAL, Aug. 3,
2010, available at http://www.thelocal.se/28158/20100803.
84 Juvenile Criminal Law, SWISS PORTAL, http://www.ch.ch/private/00093/
00104/00514/00524/index.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2012).
85 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Third Periodic Reports of
States Parties Due in 2002: Addendum, Mexico, ¶ 304, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/125/Add.7 (Aug. 24, 2005).
86 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Report on the Implementation
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child in Bahrain, 29th Sess., Jan. 14,
2002–Feb. 1, 2002, 37, (Oct. 1, 2001). One juvenile had been sentenced to ten
years for throwing a bomb at a policeman, but the sentence was later
reduced. Id. at 38. In 2010, one lawyer reported that “the toughest
punishment ever meted on a minor” was six years, after a court found a
sixteen-year-old guilty of running over an older gentleman several times,
killing him. Suad Hamada, Rights-Bahrain: Law on Young Offenders Needs
Fixing – Critics, INTER PRESS SERVICE (Aug. 25, 2010), http://www.global
issues.org/ news/2010/08/25/6734.
87 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Second Periodic Reports of
States Parties Due in 1999, Slovakia, ¶ 319, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/SVK/2 (Sept.
21, 2006).
88 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Periodic Reports Due in 1994,
Cape Verde, ¶ 184, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/11/Add.23 (Jan. 9, 2001).
89 Denmark, now controlled by a right-wing parliament, kept its
maximum sentence at eight years, the punishment that has been in place
since 1930. See Britta Kyvsgaard, Youth Justice in Denmark, 31 CRIME &
JUST. 349, 372 (2004).
90 U.N. Comm. of the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties
Due in 1993: Addendum, Estonia, ¶ 40, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/8/Add.45 (July 11,
2002).
91 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Third Periodic Reports of
States Parties Due in 2002, Honduras, ¶¶ 370–71, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/HND/3
(July 27, 2006).
92 U.N. Comm. of the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties
Due in 1993: Addendum, Iceland, ¶ 379, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/11/Add.6, (Mar. 15,
1995).
93 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties
Due in 1996, Mozambique, ¶¶ 564–68, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/41/Add.11 (May 14,
2001) (children under sixteen cannot be incarcerated for any reason).
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Armenia94

10

Azerbaijan95

10

Burma97

10

Cameroon98

Croatia100

10

Eritrea103

10

Czech
Republic101
Ethiopia104

[Vol. XXIV:1
10

10

Bosnia and
Herzegovina96
Chad99

10

Egypt102

10

10

Germany105

10

10

94 UNICEF, ASSESSMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ACHIEVEMENTS IN
ARMENIA 23 (2010).
95 U.N. Comm. of the Rights of the Child, Second Periodic Reports of
States Parties Due in 1999, Azerbaijan, ¶ 452, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/83/Add.13
(Apr. 7, 2005).
96 U.N. Comm. of the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties
Due in 1999, Bosnia and Herzegovina, ¶ 360, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/11/Add.28
(Oct. 14, 2004).
97 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties
Due in 1993: Addendum, Myanmar, ¶ 71, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/8/Add.9 (Sept. 18,
1995).
98 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties
Due in 1995: Addendum, Cameroon, ¶ 226, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/28/Add.16 (Mar.
26, 2001).
99 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Second Periodic Reports of
States Parties Due in 1997, Chad, ¶ 271, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/TCD/2 (Dec. 14,
2007).
100 U.N. Comm. of the Rights of the Child, Second Periodic Reports of
States Parties Due in 1998, Croatia, ¶ 151, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/70/Add.23 (Nov.
28, 2003).
101 UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties
Due in 1994: Addendum, Czech Republic, ¶ 245, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/11/Add.11
(June 17, 1996).
102 UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Periodic Reports of States
Parties Due in 1997: Addendum, Egypt, ¶ 194 (xi), U.N. Doc. CRC/C/65/Add.9
(Nov. 11, 1999).
103 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States
Parties Due in 1996: Addendum, Eritrea, ¶ 78(b), U.N. Doc. CRC/C/41/Add.12
(Dec. 23, 2002).
104 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States
Parties Due in 1993: Addendum, Ethiopia, ¶ 43, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/8/Add.27
(Sept. 12, 1995).
105 UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties
Due in 1994: Addendum, Germany, ¶ 36, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/11/Add.5 (Sept.
16, 1994).
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Kyrgyzstan106

10

Latvia107

10

Lithuania108

10

Macedonia109

10

Montenegro110

10

Oman111

10

Serbia112

10

Slovenia113

10

Spain114

10

Togo115

10

Tunisia116

10

Ukraine117

10

United Arab
Emirates118

10

Bulgaria119

12

Finland120

12

U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States
Parties Due in 1996, Kyrgyzstan, ¶ 255, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/41/Add.6 (Sept. 20,
1999).
107 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States
Parties Due in 1994, Latvia, ¶ 231, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/11/Add.22 (Mar. 22,
2000).
108 Penal Code, § 90(5) (2000) (Lith.) (even this punishment is only
instituted for acts of terrorism committed by a juvenile).
109 UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties
Due in 1993: Addendum, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, ¶ 236,
U.N. Doc. CRC/C/8/Add.36 (June 27, 1997).
110 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States
Parties Due in 2008, Montenegro, ¶ 324, U.N. CRC/C/125/Add.7 (Nov. 23,
2008).
111 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States
Parties Due in 1999: Addendum, Oman, ¶ 55, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/78/Add.1
(July 18, 2000).
112 UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties
due in 2003, Serbia, ¶ 452, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/SRB/1 (Aug. 31, 2007).
113 UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Second Periodic Reports of
States Parties Due in 1998, Slovenia, ¶ 269, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/70/Add.19
(June 18, 2003).
114 See Cristina Rechea Alberola & Esther Fernández Molina, Continuity
and Change in the Spanish Juvenile Justice System, in INTERNATIONAL
HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 342 (J. Junger-Tas & S.H. Decker eds., 2006)
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK].
115 UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties
Due in 1992: Addendum, Togo, ¶ 101, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/3/Add.42 (May 28,
1996).
116 UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Periodic Reports of States
Parties Due in 1999, Tunisia, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/83/Add.1 (Oct. 30, 2001).
117 UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties
Due in 1993: Addendum, Ukraine, ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/8/Add.10/Rev.1
(Jan. 18, 1995).
118 UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties
Due in 1999, United Arab Emirates, ¶ 108, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/78/Add.2 (Oct.
24, 2001).
119 UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties
Due in 1993: Addendum, Bulgaria, ¶ 264, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/8/Add.29 (Oct. 12,
1995).
120 E-mail from Tapio Lappi-Seppälä, Dir., Nat’l Research Inst. of Legal
106
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Jordan121

12

Kazakhstan122

12

Syria123

12

Austria124

15

Costa Rica125

15

Georgia126

15

Lebanon127

15

Lesotho128

15

Liechtenstein129

15

Moldova130

15

Suriname131

15

Congo132

20

Policy, Finland, to David A. Shapiro (Nov. 19, 2010, 4:53 AM) (on file with
author).
121 UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties
Due in 1993: Addendum, Jordan, ¶ 155, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/8/Add.4 (Nov. 26,
1993). The adult corollary is the death penalty. Abolitionist and Retentionist
Countries, AMNESTY INT’L, http://www.amnesty.org/en/death-penalty/abolition
ist-and-retentionist-countries (last visited Dec. 20, 2010).
122 UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties
Due in 1996: Addendum, Kazakhstan, ¶ 306, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/41/Add.13
(Sept. 24, 2002). The adult corollary is the death penalty. Abolitionist and
Retentionist Countries, supra note 121.
123 UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties
Due in 1995: Addendum, Syrian Arab Republic, ¶ 250, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/28/Add.2 (Feb. 14, 1996). The Syrian sentences are served with
compulsory labor. Id. The adult corollary is the death penalty. Id.
124 Karin Bruckmüller, Austria: A Protection Model, in INTERNATIONAL
HANDBOOK, supra note 114, at 287. See also, U.N. Comm. on the Rights of
the Child, Second Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 1999, Austria, ¶
640, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/83/Add.8 (July 8, 2004) (individuals between eighteen
and twenty one receive a maximum of twenty years).
125 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Third Periodic Reports of
States Parties Due in 2002, Costa Rica, ¶ 601, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/125/Add.4
(Oct. 13, 2004).
126 Crim. Code § 88(2) (2000) (Geor.).
127 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States
Parties Due in 1993: Addendum, Lebanon, ¶ 135, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/8/Add.23
(Feb. 3, 1995).
128 Carina du Toit, A Measure of Last Resort? Child Offenders and Life
Imprisonment, 17 S. AFR. CRIME Q. 13, 15 (Sept. 2006).
129 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States
Parties Due in 1998, Liechtenstein, ¶ 235, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/61/Add.1 (Aug. 2,
1999).
130 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States
Parties Due in 1995, Moldova, ¶ 110, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/28/Add.19 (May 3,
2002).
131 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States
Parties Due in 1995: Addendum, Suriname, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/28/Add.11
(Sept. 23, 1998) [hereinafter U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child,
Suriname].
132 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States
Parties Due in 1999, Congo, ¶ 432, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/COG/1 (Feb. 20, 2006).
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Djibouti133

20

France134

20

Hungary135

20

Mali136

20

Morocco137

20

Norway138

20

Romania139

20

Rwanda140

20

Senegal141

20

South
Korea142

20

Tajikistan143

20

United States144

62

As the charts above depict, at least forty countries, from
Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and beyond, abide by the
principle that ten years is the maximum appropriate sentence
133 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States
Parties Due in 1993, Djibouti, ¶ 141, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/8/Add.39 (Aug. 3,
1998).
134 ORDONNANCE DU 2 FEVRIER 1945 RELATIVE À L’ENFANCE DELINQUANTE
[ORDINANCE OF 2 FEBRUARY 1945 RELATIVE TO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY], art. 33
(Fr.).
135 UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties
Due in 1993: Addendum, Hungary, ¶ 77, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/8/Add.34 (Sept. 24,
1996).
136 UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Second Periodic Reports of
States Parties Due in 1997, Mali, ¶ 111, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/MLI/2 (Apr. 11,
2006).
137 U.N. Comm. of the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States
Parties Due in 1995: Addendum, Kingdom of Morocco, ¶ 310, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/28/Add.1 (Aug. 19, 1995).
138 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States
Parties Due in 1992: Addendum, Norway, ¶ 163, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/8/Add.7
(Oct. 12, 1993).
139 U.N. Comm. of the Rights of the Child, Periodic Reports of States
Parties Due in 1999, Romania, ¶ 169, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/65/Add.19 (July 5,
2002).
140 UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Second Periodic Reports of
States Parties Due in 1998, Rwanda, ¶ 92, U.N. Doc CRC/C/70/Add.22 (Oct. 8,
2003).
141 UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties
Due in 1992: Addendum, Senegal, ¶ 199, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/3/Add.31 (Oct. 17,
1994).
142 U.N. Comm. of the Rights of the Child, Periodic Reports of States
Parties Due in 1998, Republic of Korea, ¶ 52, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/70/Add.14
(June 26, 2002).
143 UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Second Periodic Reports of
States Parties Due in 2000, Tajikistan, ¶ 100, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/TJK/2 (Apr. 2,
2009).
144 Assuming life imprisonment without parole as maximum punishment,
based on current average life expectancy, for youth arrested at approximately
fourteen years. Life Expectancy at Birth, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2102.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2012).
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for juveniles.145 No fewer than five countries have maximums
of twelve years.146 At least eight have fifteen-year
maximums.147 A mix of at least twelve Asian, African, and
both Eastern and Western European nations have maximum
sentences of twenty years imprisonment.148
Several countries apply simple rules to make sense of
sentencing laws, typically in the form of fractional
punishments.149 Chile, for instance, reduces the maximum
possible sentence to the lowest applicable measure, and then
reduces it even further.150 In six countries, the maximum
juvenile sentence is half the maximum of an adult sentence.151
In Russia, the maximum punishment of a juvenile is two-thirds
the time of the potential adult sentence.152 In Suriname, where
minors under the age of sixteen cannot be imprisoned for any
reason, those between the ages of sixteen and eighteen can be

See supra pp. 17–23.
Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 See infra p. 17–20.
150 UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties
Due in 1993: Addendum, Chile, ¶ 237, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/3/Add.18 (June 22,
1993).
151 UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Periodic Reports of
States Parties Due in 1994, Albania, ¶ 480, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/11/Add. 27 (July
5, 2004); UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States
Parties, Andorra, ¶ 125, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/61/Add.3 (July 3, 2001); UN Comm.
on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties Due in 1992:
Addendum, Benin Corrigendum, ¶ 99, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/3/Add.52 (July 4,
1997); UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Second Periodic Reports of
States Parties Due in 1997, Bhutan, ¶ 388, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/BTN/2 (July 16,
2007); UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States Parties
Due in 1994: Addendum, Cambodia, ¶ 234, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/11/Add.16 (June
24, 1998). In Albania, the absolute maximum is twelve and a half years.
UNICEF, ASSESSMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ACHIEVEMENTS IN
ALBANIA 21 (2009). The same is true for those fourteen to sixteen in Guinea,
while those sixteen to eighteen can only be sentenced to terms that allow for
their rehabilitation. UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports
Awaited from the States Parties For 1992: Addendum, Guinea, ¶ 108, 113,
U.N. Doc. CRC/C/3/Add.48 (June 17, 1997); Anne Wyvekens, The French
Juvenile Justice System, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 114, at
184.
152 UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Periodic Reports of States
Parties Due in 1997: Addendum, Russian Federation, ¶ 410, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/65/Add.5 (Nov. 20, 1998).
145
146
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sentenced to one-third the equivalent adult penalty.153 These
countries all recognize that there is something different about
childhood.
Globally, then, sentences are as progressive as they are
diverse and there are no clear trends in the countries from
which one can infer that the sentence caps were hastily passed
into law, that they do not work, or that they are a product of a
certain type of globalized thinking necessarily at odds with
American values. Countries have gone well beyond the calling
of the CRC and they have done just enough to comply with it.
They have enacted reforms at the United Nations’ urging and
they have led the charge encouraging other countries to
comply.
From an American perspective, massing hundreds of
nations into one conglomerate of those “more reformed than us”
is ineffective in the long-term. Each country has its own
reasons for its specific juvenile justice system. The sentencing
schemes delineated above illuminate the various individual
juvenile sentencing practices across the globe. The juvenile
justice reform community has overlooked these individual
sentences, and the rationales behind them, for far too long.
This article encourages advocates to think about these
sentences and how they might be able to domesticate them in
the fifty states.
III. BRINGING INTERNATIONAL JUVENILE SENTENCING
STANDARDS & REFORMS HOME
Because some countries have reformed their juvenile
sentencing laws based upon doctrine that does not resemble
our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, America can learn from,
but the Supreme Court cannot consider, the sentencing policies
in these countries.
The United States’ arguably unique
traditions and interest rooted in independence, responsibility,
and its lack of primacy on protecting children (exemplified by
the fact that its Constitution does not seek to provide for their
education or protection), prevents major change on the national
level in the arena of juvenile justice reform. Reformers remain
153
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in a position to advocate for change on the state and local
levels.
While scholars continue to include international law in
amicus briefs to the Supreme Court,154 the better approach is to
use the same evidence and analysis to convince state
legislators to enact viable reform. State legislatures enact the
overwhelming majority of criminal laws. The states are called
“test tubes”155 because legislatures at the local level may be
more willing to take risks and embrace new ideas.156 Finally,
by shifting advocacy from the federal courts to the state
legislatures, reforms will be implemented sooner and without
the conservative backlash that comes with advocating “foreign”
ideas in American courts.
State governments, even as they have recently become
more conservative, will be receptive to the ideas of juvenile
justice reformers provided they are appropriately framed.
Counties in Arizona and Florida have recently become part of
the Juvenile Justice System Improvement Project, a program
that will help localities institute effective policies to increase
outcomes for court-involved youth.157
North Carolina is
working to increase the age at which children can be
automatically tried as adults.158 The Annie E. Casey Juvenile
Detention Alternative Initiative is helping spread reform to
counties of all sizes and political values.159
Social theorists point out how policies and sentences of
other countries can be made relevant in the United States.
According to the social impact theory, in order for individuals
to adopt and advocate for new ideas, they must have stable and
consistent access to them. Thus, as long as ideas espoused by
See, e.g., Brief for Amnesty International, supra note 27.
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
156 Eric Holder, Attorney Gen., Address at the National Association of
Counties Legislative Conference (Mar. 7, 2001), available at http://www.
justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2011/ag-speech-110307.html.
157 Juvenile Justice System Information Project, CENTER FOR JUVENILE
JUST. REFORM, http://cjjr.georgetown.edu/jjsip/jjsip.html (last visited Feb. 15,
2012).
158 Shavonne Potts, NY Only Other State Treating 16-, 17-Year-Olds as
Adults, SALISBURY POST (July 17, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.salisburypost.
com/News/071711-juvenile-offender-sidebar-qcd.
159 ROCHELLE STANFIELD, PATHWAYS TO JUVENILE DETENTION REFORM: THE
JDAI STORY (1999).
154
155
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the global community are consistently highlighted by
advocates, the more those ideas will be discussed and the more
they will become normalized.160
It stands to reason, therefore, that knowledge and
discussion of foreign sentencing policies is helpful to
formulating state sentencing laws. As Justice Thomas worried
in his Graham dissent, the majority’s decision to hold JLWOP
unconstitutional constituted a “moral judgment” that had no
These moral
place in federal court jurisprudence.161
judgments, however, form the basis of how we all think. Using
the model of social impact theory, advocates can increase
exposure to new ideas in order to help inform the moral
judgments of state legislators—the people Justice Thomas
would like to see make changes.
The countries below have been selected for analysis
because their models offer dichotomous approaches to those
that exist in the United States and because there is something
about the country that makes it an interesting (though not
necessarily apt) comparator. It is important to recognize that
they are included not because they provide the “correct” ways
of reforming juvenile justice, but because they provide unique
perspectives on the issue.
A. Country Models for Reform162: South Africa
South Africa’s model of juvenile justice reform is one of a
conflux of international law, public policy expertise, and
democratic and local values coming together to form a more
reformed, progressive juvenile justice system. Crucially, South
Africa has been perhaps the greatest success story for juvenile
reform through an almost complete reconstructing of its
“To the extent that individuals are relatively uninvolved in an issue,
they should be influenced by the strength, immediacy, and number of people
advocating a contrary position.” Andrzej Nowak et. al., From Private Attitude
to Public Opinion: A Dynamic Theory of Social Impact, 97 PSYCHOL. REV. 362,
364 (1990).
161 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2053 (2010) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
162 I chose several countries’ juvenile justice systems for evaluation. The
choices were relatively random—I simply attempted to pick countries that
either had a strong connection to America, either culturally, socially, or
historically, or those with a plethora of research available.
160
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governing system following Apartheid, during which it created
a strong, progressive Constitution.163
As recently as 1999, South Africa had four children serving
LWOP.164 In 1995, however, South Africa ratified the CRC.
International law is binding upon South Africa, but it still
enacted a new law to eliminate JLWOP, amongst other
reforms.165 The CRC and the principles of restorative justice
were the joint impetus behind the new law.166 The protections
for juveniles in South Africa also centered on “the indigenous
concept of Ubuntu,167 thus Africanizing the international
principles by emphasizing family and community.”168
Certainly, this makes the juvenile justice reformer’s task more
difficult. Advocating for reduced sentencing in America to be
more like South Africa’s, or the sentencing of any country
where its constitution was similarly established, ignores the
163 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO
261 (2001) (calling South Africa’s Constitution: “[t]he most admirable
constitution in the history of the world” and “the world’s leading example of a
transformative constitution.”).
164 Connie de la Vega & Michelle Leighton, Sentencing Our Children to
Die in Prison: Global Law and Practice, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 983, 999 (2008)
(citing U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Reports of States
Parties Due in 1997: Addendum, South Africa, ¶ 514, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/51/Add.2 (May 22, 1998)). A law instituted in 1998, however, ensured
the opportunity for a parole hearing after one had served twenty-five years of
his or her life sentence. ANN SKELTON & BOYANE TSHEHLA, INSTITUTE FOR
SECURITY STUDIES, CHILD JUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA, 18 (2008) (citing the
Correctional Service Act 111 of 1998 (S. Afr.)).
165 John D. Van der Vyver, International Standards for the Promotion
and Protection of Children’s Rights: American and South African Dimensions,
15 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 81, 106 (2009); Julia Sloth-Nielsen & Benyam D.
Mezmur, 2 + 2 = 5? Exploring the Domestication of the CRC in South African
Jurisprudence (2002-2006), 16 INT’L J CHILDREN’S RTS. 1, 3 n.3 (2008).
166 SKELTON & TSHEHLA, supra note 164; see also Child Justice Act of
2008 (S. Afr.).
167 Ubuntu is “a frame of mind prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa, which
relates to a specific communal approach to the notion of people.” Stefan
Schulz & Marthinus Hamutenya, Juvenile Justice in Namibia: Law Reform
Towards Reconciliation and Restorative Justice? 1 (Polytech of Nambia,
Paper, 2004). “Ubuntu is very difficult to render into a Western language. It
speaks of the very essence of being human.” Archbishop Desmond Tutu
explains Ubuntu is linked to forgiveness, and a system of shared values that
enables survival and increases the humanity of all. Ann Skelton, Restorative
Justice as a Framework for Juvenile Justice Reform, 42 BRIT. J. CRIMINOL.
496, 499 (2002).
168 S. AFR. L. COMM’N, PROJECT 106: JUVENILE JUSTICE REPORT 8 (2000).
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fundamental differences between our society and theirs, which
must be addressed before we can pursue real change.
Still, that some South African values are not American
should not mean that they are the wrong values or that
America cannot adopt these values for its own. South Africa
provides a clear model of a country that can create its own
juvenile legislation in accordance with both domestic and
international law. It is also special in that the creation of its
current juvenile legislation was done in an open manner,
embracing criticism and suggestions from laypeople, lawyers,
scholars, and even children.169 Ironically, the Commission that
helped craft the legislation expressly repudiated placing a
maximum on juvenile sentencing.170 In fact, the South African
drafters were “concerned that this might lead to effective
multiplicity of charges in order to ensure the possibility of
lengthy sentences (e.g., several fifteen-year terms) being
imposed.”171
Relying on Ubuntu and international law,
therefore, the drafters “opted not to set a maximum term of
imprisonment, and trust[ed] that the fact of youthful age
[would] play a large role in mitigating excessively long
sentences for children.”172 Though Ubuntu might not be easily
Westernized, advocates can still press for juvenile sentencing
maximums and more holistic treatment options at the state
level. Reformers can also look to the method by which South
Africa passed its legislation, instituting similar committees in
the United States.
B. Increasing Rehabilitative Reform Efforts: Argentina, Greece
& Finland
Reformers can also use international juvenile sentencing
norms to advocate for an increased emphasis on rehabilitation
in the United States. Argentina’s highest court looked to
several factors in prohibiting JLWOP, including various UN
treaties, the CRC, and even In re Gault,173 the United States
Supreme Court case that recognized the due process rights of
Id. at 166.
Id.
171 Id. at 168.
172 Id. at 168–69.
173 In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
169
170

27

146

PACE INT’L LAW REV.

[Vol. XXIV:1

minors.174 Indeed, the Supreme Court of Justice of Argentina
held, “the decision of the [lower chamber sentencing the
juvenile to life imprisonment without parole for at least
twenty-five years] does not exhibit any understanding why a
penalty of [fourteen] years in prison for a crime committed at
age [sixteen] was insufficient.”175 The insufficiency probably
lay in the instinct and desire to enact vengeance. Reformers
ought to press this notion by digging deeper into sentencing
law and asking what rehabilitation—not vengeance—requires.
This tactic might be difficult to use at the state level. It
requires an honest examination of America’s willingness to
punish for retribution over all other reasons, asking legislators
to re-evaluate how they conceive of punishment.
Greece was also concerned with the rehabilitation/
retribution balance. The CRC had little impact in Greece prior
to 2010, as the nation had always complied with the Article 37
mandate.176 Still, in 2002, the UN Committee on the Rights of
the Child asked Greece to abolish provisions allowing for a
child to be imprisoned for a period of twenty years.177 Greece
responded in 2010, passing legislation to change the maximum
sentence to fifteen years.178 Greece reformed its sentencing for
many reasons, one of which was a worry that a longer sentence

174 Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación, [CSJN][National Supreme
Court of Justice], 7/12/2005, “Maldonado, Daniel Enrique/Senetencia” (Arg.).
175 Id. It is unclear whether the Maldonado decision applies retroactively.
As the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child reported, while Maldonado
was significant, “of the 12 life sentences of children passed since 1997 to
2002, three still face[d] life imprisonment . . . [and] that their cases have been
brought to the attention of the Inter-American Commission of Human
Rights.” Convention on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations:
Argentina, May 25, 2010–June 11, 2010, ¶ 38, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/ARG/CO/3–4,
54th Sess., (June 21, 2010). “While welcoming the fact that no more life
sentences have been passed since 2002, the Committee urges the State party
to refrain from sentencing children to life imprisonment or sentences that
may amount to life imprisonment.” Id. at ¶ 39.
176 Angelika Pitsela, Greece: Criminal Responsibility of Minors in the
National and International Legal Orders, 75 INT’L REV. PEN. L. 356, 377
(2004).
177 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Greece, ¶ 78(h), U.N. Doc. CRC/
C/15/Add.170; 29th Sess., (Apr. 2, 2002).
178 E-mail from Professor Calliope Spinellis to David A. Shapiro, (Sep. 29,
2010, 3:51 AM) (on file with author) (translating Article 54 of the Greek
Penal Code as amended by Article 1 Act 3860/2010).
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constituted cruel and unusual punishment.179 The other
reasons included “the absence of [effective] rehabilitation
programs” in juvenile facilities.180 This implies, ironically, that
Greece decreased sentences because there was not enough of an
emphasis on rehabilitation. American legislators ought to
follow suit. To reach both liberal and conservative legislatures,
the argument is this: we can tie sentencing norms to the
availability of best practices models that assure all that is
possible has been done to protect juveniles and to dissuade
them from committing crimes. Reducing crimes reduces costs.
Sentencing reforms, thus, can be part of a national juvenile
justice overhaul, conducted state-by-state.
In Finland, where the maximum adult sentences are also
quite low, its less punitive juvenile sentencing regime is also
based on an overall emphasis on rehabilitation rather than on
a conception of cruel and unusual punishment.181 Indeed, the
“[sentencing] reform movement was inspired by the belief that
crime was predominantly a social problem that could be
counteracted by social reform, rather than repression.”182 In
Ewing v. California, the Supreme Court expressly held that
“[a] sentence can have a variety of justifications, such as
incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation.”183 If
reform toward rehabilitation were to become the norm,
pursuing such change at the federal court level could prove illadvised because the Supreme Court has never required a
singular justification for punishment. Still, to obtain the
overwhelmingly successful results Finland has seen, states
would need to embrace a more welfare-oriented ideology, at
179 E-mail from Professor Calliope Spinellis, to David A. Shapiro (Nov.
17, 2010, 4:33 AM) (on file with author).
180 Id.
181 E-mail from Tapio Lappi-Seppälä, Dir., Nat’l Research Inst. of Legal
Policy, Finland, to David A. Shaprio (Nov. 22, 2010, 4:33 AM) (on file with
author).
182 See Tapio Lappi-Seppälä, Finland: A Model of Tolerance?, in CRITICAL
ISSUES, supra note 3, at 183–84.
183 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) (plurality opinion) (Scalia,
J. concurring in the judgment at 31–32); cf. Vincent G. Lévy, Note, Enforcing
International Norms in the United States after Roper v. Simmons: The Case of
Juvenile Offenders Sentenced to Life Without Parole, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 262, 290 (2007) (providing no citation for the proposition that
“[n]evertheless, the Constitution arguably could require U.S. jurisdictions to
emphasize rehabilitation,” clearly in conflict with Ewing).
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odds with the emphasis on individuality and due process
protections that defines the American justice system. Success
would not become a left versus right battle, but one of
prioritization—would the American electorate be more
comfortable, if forced to choose, with a model more steeped in
expertise, or rights protection?
C. Bringing our Own Norms Back Home: Afghanistan & Japan
In evaluating American concepts of evolving dignity,
reformers should look to the nations that America helped to
create and the juvenile justice systems within fledging nations
in which we have commanded a strong presence. Many
countries with some of the most progressive sentencing regimes
can be found in Africa and Eastern Europe, where developing
countries have modeled their democracies and governing
structures on our own.184 Outside of a basis in the CRC, or
customary jus cogens norms, these countries have reformed
their juvenile sentencing policies because of American values
and our own history of juvenile legislation. Developing nations
and those coming out of dictatorial rule look to Western
guidelines to develop sound rules of law and governance.
These same countries are on the forefront of progressive
juvenile sentencing. If these nations are going off what they
most admire in the United States, is it not time to reevaluate
our own principles, particularly as they relate to what makes
sense in terms of juvenile sentencing in the twenty-first
century? It must be possible to justify banning JLWOP within
a domestic context, after all, if other nations were able to look
to our own to justify doing away with JLWOP. Again, as its
rhetoric demonstrates, the Supreme Court is too timid to face
this truth, and such an argument should play out not only at
the Court, but locally.
In 2005, after the ratification of its new United Statesinspired Constitution, Afghanistan enacted a Juvenile Code,
affirming that “the best interests of the child should be taken
into consideration.”185 Significantly, the Code banned life
See infra pp. 26–28.
U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Initial Report of States Parties
Due in 1996, Afghanistan, ¶ 41, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/AFG/1 (June 13, 2010).
184
185
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imprisonment and the death penalty for minors.186
Afghanistan continues to build its new government with
America’s help. Indeed, Afghanistan’s laws allow for capital
punishment,187 yet its juvenile sentences are more progressive.
This is an emotive argument—one that can be made to states.
Do we really want to be behind the countries we help to build?
To conservatives, advocates can argue that we maintain
American exceptionalism by being true to our values—that is,
those we have exported abroad.
Japan’s original juvenile legislation was also passed almost
entirely due to American influence: “to bring the juvenile
justice system into line with the post-war democratic
constitution.”188 Aware that the American system “focused on
what was best for the juvenile—and thus society—in the longterm,”189 Japan sought to emulate what was most effective
about the American legal system.190 It makes sense that the
Japanese adopted a rather progressive juvenile sentencing
regime. Indeed, while scholars compare domestic sentencing to
sentencing regimes of foreign lands, Japan serves as a crucial
comparator because its media culture resembles our own.191
There, as here, media portrayals of youth violence play a large
role, contributing to America’s desire to institute harsh,
punitive sentences at the expense of more progressive,
restorative, and rehabilitative practices.192 Indeed, in response
to several highly publicized, horrific incidents committed by
juveniles, Japan revised its Juvenile Act in 2000; it had not
done so “since the Allied Occupation in 1949.”193 While
juveniles would receive a maximum sentence of fifteen years
186 Id. ¶ 82. For children sixteen to eighteen, it allows for only half the
equivalent adult sentence. Id. For children twelve to sixteen, it allows only up
to a third of the equivalent adult sentence. Id.
187 Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries, supra note 121.
188 Trevor Ryan, Creating ‘Problem Kids’: Juvenile Crime in Japan and
Revisions to the Juvenile Act, 10 J. JAPAN L., 153, 155 (2005).
189 Id.
190 Mark Fenwick, Japan: From Child Protection to Penal Populism, in
CRITICAL ISSUES, supra note 3, at 147.
191 See Japanese Juvenile Justice, BBC WORLD SERVICE (Feb. 24, 2001),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/people/highlights/010223_japan.shtml.
192 See Ryan, supra note 188 at 176–78.
193 See Japanese Juvenile Justice, supra note 191; Ryan, supra note 188,
at 153.
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for an act punishable by life imprisonment if committed by an
adult, Japan still allows life imprisonment for minors who have
committed capital crimes.194 In 2005, its Supreme Court
authorized the sentence of life imprisonment with labor for a
juvenile who had committed homicide.195 Reformers can learn
two things from Japan: first, how to respond to media, and
second, how to push for quick reforms.
D. Learning from the Research: The UK & Western Europe
Not only does Great Britain provide an example of a
country with penal legislation and values extremely similar to
our own, but it also highlights the value that can be found in
effective data collection to promote juvenile justice reform.
Great Britain has effectively prohibited the punishment of
JLWOP “for the better part of the past seventy-five years. The
prohibition emerged historically in recognition of the inherent
instability and emotionally imbalance of persons under age
[eighteen], which made such sentences cruel and unusual.”196
Many of the countries with the harshest juvenile sentencing
laws only have them because such “legislation . . . [drew]
heavily from the U.K. Children’s Act of 1908, long since
abandoned by the British, which was based on the outdated
notion of rounding up and containing all delinquent and
‘incorrigible’ children.”197 Research shows that “[t]his approach
has been proven to be both costly and ineffective; in most
194 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Second Periodic Reports of
States Parties Due in 2001, Japan, ¶ 91, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/104/Add.2 (July 24,
2003) [hereinafter U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Japan].
195 Tomoki Ikenaga, The Phenomenon in the United States Juvenile
Justice System of Blending Protective Sentencing and Criminal Sentencing,
and the Issue of Stiffer Penalties in the Japanese Justice System, 1–2 (Ctr. for
the Study of Law & Soc., Berkeley, Working Paper, May 27, 2005). “However,
the amended law now allows the court to decide whether the sentence should
be life imprisonment or limited-term imprisonment.” U.N. Comm. on the
Rights of the Child, Japan, supra note 194, ¶ 91. Finally, not only is parole
available in Japan, but it is often obtained within seven years of the
sentence. UN Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Third Periodic Reports of
States Parties Due in 2006, Japan, ¶ 512, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/JPN/3 (Sept. 25,
2009).
196 Brief for Amnesty International, supra note 27.
197 UNICEF REG’L OFFICE FOR SOUTH ASIA, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN SOUTH
ASIA: IMPROVING PROTECTION FOR CHILDREN IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW 28
(2006).
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commonwealth countries, it has been supplanted by more childcentered, rights-based approaches focused on restorative
justice and community-based rehabilitation.”198
While
England’s approach remains “more repressive than that of
most other European countries,”199 crucially, “it seems more
pragmatic than that of the United States.”200 Pragmatism is
what is called for. Indeed, we have a “tradition”201 of “strong
empirical research,”202 yet we refuse to build upon it.203
Instead, Western Europe has used our research time and time
again to build programs that comply with international norms,
reduce recidivism, minimize juvenile crime, respect
individualism, and increase educational opportunity.204
England has invested heavily in “generalized preventive
policies”205 and a “gradual approach to youth crime”206 rather
than bending to American all-or-nothing conceptions of threestrikes policies and a “do the crime-pay the time mindset” that
fails the test of logic when applied to juveniles.207
Finally, in Belgium, only recently was the maximum
sentence lowered to thirty years from life imprisonment.208 The
change had little to do with the CRC.209 The Belgian system is
Id.
Josine Junger-Tas, Trends in International Juvenile Justice: What
Conclusions Can Be Drawn?, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 114,
at 513.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 527.
203 On the other hand, two of the more powerful and far-reaching juvenile
justice reform programs, Models for Change and the Annie E. Casey
Foundation’s Juvenile Detention Alternative Initiative (JDAI), have recently
begun to use data in their push for change.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 513.
206 Id.
207 Donna M. Bishop & Scott H. Decker, Punishment and Control:
Juvenile Justice Reform in the US, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note
114, at 20–21.
208 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Second Periodic Reports of
States Parties Due in 2001, Japan, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.38 (June
20, 1995).
209 E-mail from An Nuytiens, to David A. Shapiro (Nov. 22, 2010, 6:14
AM) (on file with author). In 1995, it appeared that, at least statutorily, life
imprisonment was available for minors between the ages of sixteen and
eighteen.
198
199
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welfare-oriented.210 While more criminal justice elements are
being added to juvenile legislation, the fact that Belgium
recently changed its maximum sentence reveals that
retributivism—an increasingly punitive practice—can co-exist
beside a juvenile welfare-oriented legal system.
Thus,
reformers can use models present in Belgium to advocate for
the welfare-oriented models found in Scandinavian countries,
resolving the problem of rehabilitation versus retribution.
Reformers should concentrate on domestic reform using
various international principles so that our standard of decency
will evolve, placing real reform on much more stable ground
than tenuous 5–4 Supreme Court decisions.211
We can reform juvenile practices while acknowledging that
some of the ideas behind reforms in other countries appear not
to mesh with our cultural norms. The United States does not
have Ubuntu, nor can we ask our citizens to suddenly adopt a
concept that has been thriving in Africa. Scholars can use the
values of education and rehabilitation, however, to build a
model that enables children to become more independent.
Reformers might want to push for an elimination of the
transfer procedures that allow youth to be tried in adult courts,
for example. What is perhaps most troubling about the use of
the juvenile transfer is that it is based entirely on retributive
ideology and has little to do with the American value of
individualized judgment. The model exists to prosecute the
“worst” juvenile offenders, judging children as adults by
looking first at the horrific nature of their crime and only
second (if ever) to the reduced culpability that comes from
youth. Even in jurisdictions that claim to look at the offender
holistically before conducting a transfer, this statement is
accurate.
Transfer would not even be contemplated for
relatively minor crimes, even if the juvenile were completely
aware of the nature of the crime and its consequences. Thus,
there needs to be an acknowledgment at the most basic level
that our justice system at the juvenile level is still based in a
concept of vengeance, rather than rehabilitation. If America
Id.
Although Graham was a 6–3, Judge Roberts’ concurrence stipulated
that he would not ban LJWOP for non-homicide offenders as a general rule.
See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2036 (2010) (Roberts, J. concurring).
210
211
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truly values independence and freedom, it must do away with
juvenile transfers, just as many other nations have. The
average maximum juvenile sentence internationally, across all
continents, is roughly fifteen years.212 Clearly, America needs
real change. These issues become meaningless if juvenile
justice reformers at the state and national levels can
successfully advocate for juvenile sentencing reforms using the
examples provided by the various countries discussed in this
article.
We have already made progress. Roper and Graham have
led the discussion at the national level. At the state and local
levels, as the so-called “‘superpredator myth’ of the early 1990s
that derailed”213 progress comes to a head, America is also
moving in a less punitive direction. The Annie E. Casey
Foundation’s Juvenile Detention Alternative Initiative214 and
Models for Change programs make headway,215 as does “the
rise in litigation against juvenile corrections and fiscal
pressures.”216 The Obama Administration has also recently
announced “Race to the Top” grants to encourage states to
think outside the box on juvenile justice reform issues.217
These discretionary grants go to the states that develop the
most innovative, groundbreaking methods for increasing
outcomes for juvenile offenders and reducing recidivism.
Advocates can use this incentive to push state legislatures to
look not only to competitor states, but to other countries, with
whom they do not have to compete for the block funding. As
juvenile reformers continue to move forward on these bases, I
urge them not to forget all they can learn from the
international arena.

See supra pp. 17–19.
E-mail from Dr. Barry Krisberg to David A. Shapiro (Nov. 22, 2010,
12:23 PM) (on file with author).
214 STANFIELD, supra note 159.
215 Systems Reform in Juvenile Justice, MODELS FOR CHANGE, http://www.
modelsforchange.net/index.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2012).
216 Id.
217Administration Revises Proposal on Race to the Top Funding for
Juvenile Justice, OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION (Apr. 1, 2011), http://
ojjdp.gov/enews/11juvjust/110401.html.
212
213
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E. Starting Points Inspired by Comparing other Nations
This article has emphasized the importance of focusing on
comparative, rather than international, law and using the
models found in other nations to advocate at the local levels for
change rather than the nation’s highest court. It might be best
to return to a more welfare-oriented system, premised in the
notion of expertise that justifies the existence of administrative
adjudicatory bodies. In France, for example, the most violent
juvenile offenders are tried by a three-judge panel of two youth
court judges and a regular chief magistrate.218 Of course, the
primacy placed on due process must be balanced with the need
for a welfare-oriented model. This system is easier to advocate
on paper than in practice. The transition can begin with a
decreased emphasis on the retributive model of punishment.219
Even where retribution is emphasized, however, as in
Scandinavia and Scotland,220 the principle of “just desserts”
remains prominent, but balanced, by “welfare boards, their
restraint in punishment and institutionalization and their
emphasis on treatment interventions.”221
A changed emphasis might also rest in education. The
Council of Europe’s 1987 recommendation for juvenile justice
argued that all sentences for juveniles ought to have “an
educational character.”222 In America, the National Council of
Juvenile and Family Court Judges similarly argued that
“[c]hildren are developmentally different from adults; they are
developing
emotionally
and
cognitively;
they
are
impressionable; and they have different levels of
understanding than adults.”223 The key difference is not just
the phrase “educational,” but the very idea that the European
system emphasizes an alternative to incarceration, not simply
what separates adolescents from adults in terms of culpability
and cognition, as the standard made by the American judiciary
Wyvekens, supra note 151, at 183.
J. Junger-Tas, supra note 199, at 509.
220 Id. at 528.
221 Id.
222 Id. at 510.
223 Id. at 510 (citing THE NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT
JUDGES, THE JANICULUM PROJECT: STRUCTURAL, PROCEDURAL AND
PROGRAMMATIC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE JUVENILE COURT (1998)).
218
219
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elucidates.
Jeffrey Fagan proposes having “states . . . recognize the
constitutional fact of diminished culpability of adolescents by
applying a ‘youth discount’ on sentences for juveniles who are
sentenced as adults.”224 This idea can be borrowed directly
from other countries225 and would certainly be a good start. As
Fagan continues, such a standard would reduce “the guesswork
in parole decision-making and [would infuse] the virtue of
even-handedness into the jurisprudence of juvenile crime.”226
Given America’s early 1990s media coverage that focused
on juvenile crime, reformers should seek to take control of the
media message. This could prove as important as, or even
more important than, sentencing reform.227 “Media images”228
have forced the hand of domestic politicians. “Penal populism
may emerge as the outcome of such media and political
pressures.”229 Understanding the power of media images is
crucial to reform efforts.230
Overall, as Josine Junger-Tas argues, it would be best for
America “to merge the evidence-based approach of the AngloSaxon states with the essentially humanistic juvenile justice
tradition of continental Europe”231 into a due process
framework, deemphasizing retribution for juveniles and, at the
same time, prioritizing education. While that sounds like a lot
to swallow, these types of changes should not be hard to
institute. America started the evidence-based model.232 It was
the first country to proffer a humanist model to deal with
juvenile justice.233 Our Constitution emphasizes, moreover,
due process proudly as a model for all others. In the end, the
Fagan, supra note 11.
See supra notes 109–113 and accompanying text.
226 Fagan, supra note 11.
227 See generally Carolyn Hamilton & Rachel Harvey, The Role of Public
Opinion in the Implementation of International Juvenile Justice Standards,
11 INT'L J. CHILD. RTS. 369 (2004) (describing the role the media plays in
determining the public’s view on juvenile justice legislation).
228 INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK, supra note 144, at xi.
229 Id.; see also J. Junger-Tas, supra note 199, at 522.
230 Bishop & Decker, supra note 209, at 28 (citing T.J. BERNARD, THE
CYCLE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE (1992)).
231 J. Junger-Tas, supra note 199, at 529.
232 Id. at 527.
233 Id.
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call for reform by looking abroad is a Conservative one. It asks
us to harken back to our own traditions and history—and this
is something that reformers of all political stripes can declare
allegiance to.
CONCLUSION
Even if the United States finally enacts a total ban on
JLWOP, life imprisonment remains a viable option. In Florida,
for example, where Terrance Graham was originally sentenced
to LWOP, the courts “are re-sentencing . . . juveniles to new
terms that still amount to life sentences.”234 This kind of
sentencing, unfortunately, shows that the optimism held by
juvenile justice reformers for Supreme Court decisions is
misguided.
This article has introduced a new paradigm, moving
beyond potential upcoming cases in the Supreme Court—which
will probably ask what “a meaningful opportunity of release”235
consists of or whether JLWOP is unconstitutional when applied
to juveniles who have committed felony murder236 and
homicide,237 and noting that basing the validity of JLWOP
upon international law will neither persuade decision-makers
nor lead to any real change.238
Instead, by analyzing
comparative rationales for progressive juvenile sentencing
norms, this article demonstrates that scholars can make the
most compelling case possible for real reform.
America used to be the inspiration for countries pursuing
juvenile justice reform. It stood for fairness and compassion.
It no longer does. By looking at other countries, however, the
Ashby Jones, Is Florida Ignoring a High Court Ruling on Juvenile
Sentences?, WALL ST. J., (Nov. 23, 2010; 11:31AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/
2010/11/23/is-florida-ignoring-a-high-court-ruling-on-juvenile-sentences/.
“More than six months after the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Florida’s
practice of sending juveniles to prison for the rest of their lives for nonmurder crimes was unconstitutional, not a single former juvenile sentenced
in such cases has found much relief.” Lloyd Dunkelberger, Juvenile Offenders
Still Get Near-Life Terms, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE (Nov. 21, 2010,
1:00AM), http://www.heraldtribune.com/article/20101121/ARTICLE/1121108.
235 See People v. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 870 (Ct. App. 2010).
236 See Miller v. State, 63 So.3d 676 (Ala. 2010). Indeed, the Supreme
Court has granted cert in this case. See infra note 11.
237 See Gonzalez v. Florida, 50 So. 3d 633 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
238 See Bradley, supra note 75, at 557.
234
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United States can not only recapture the American values that
once led the juvenile justice movement across the globe, but
help these values reinvigorate our own conceptions of what it
means to be fair and just. Even though the majority of western
nations increased their emphasis on punishment over
rehabilitation during the 1980s and 1990s,239 juvenile
sentencing structures remained largely intact.
Reformers
need to take Graham further. Such steps start by going well
beyond the Eighth Amendment context and actually evaluating
what other countries do. Foreign approaches may not always
be better, but they provide a fresh perspective—one that is
much needed given the current state of America’s juvenile
justice system. Advocates have been right to look abroad.
They should dig deeper for rationales that can help to create
substantive change here. They should no longer rely upon the
Supreme Court to achieve results. We can do it. Justice
Ginsburg said it best: we should never “abandon the effort to
learn what we can from the experience and good thinking
foreign sources may convey.”240

J. Junger-Tas, supra note 199, at 511.
Anne E. Kornblut, Justice Ginsburg Backs Value of Foreign Law, NY
TIMES, Apr. 2, 2005 (quoting Justice Ginsburg).
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